*I wrote this as a paper for my philosophy of religion class in the spring of 2009
William Rowe argues that
(1) There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
(2) An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
(3) There does not exist and omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.
Rowe argues that there is pointless suffering (a fawn burned by lightning in a remote forest) and therefore there is no such God. In this paper I respond to his argument. Check it out.
William L. Rowe published a very interesting article titled “The Problem of Evil”. This article presents the problem of natural evil to the theists. William Rowe, an atheist, examines possible theistic responses and, in turn, atheistic responses to the theist’s possible response. In this paper I will give a brief description and analysis of Rowe’s argument against theism including a possible theistic response with Rowe’s response to that. My paper will include a rejection of Rowe’s argument for atheism. Then the focus will then shift to ways that a Christian theist may deal with the problem of natural evil. Let me first state that I hold Rowe in high respect and am impressed with the manner in which Rowe writes. This paper is to be a critique of his argument and not his person.
First there are some terms that we should define. I will use Rowe’s definition of atheist and theist for this article to avoid any confusion. There are narrow and broad senses of atheist and theist. Rowe says that he will be using the narrow definitions of theist and atheist (Rowe 527). Well just what is the narrow use of these terms? To quote Rowe from page 527 “By a ‘theist’ in the narrow sense I mean someone who believes in the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, supremely good being who created the world.” This definition for the most part is directed at Christians and Jews. He then says on the same page that, an atheist in the narrow sense is one that “[denies] that there exists a divine being that is all-knowing, all-powerful and perfectly good.” This definition of atheism is one that is directed primarily to those who deny the Christian or Hebrew god (though they may still believe in other kinds of gods).
Also, there seems to be a definition of evil in William Rowe’s article, which I will attempt to flush out. He says that “Intense human and animal suffering, for example, occurs daily and in great plentitude in our world. Such intense suffering is a clear case of evil.” (Rowe 527) Suffering here does not define evil, but it is definitely a part of evil. It would seem that intense suffering is evil, but it would be incorrect to say that evil is intense suffering. However, later he says that “Intense human or animal suffering is in itself bad, an evil, even though it may sometimes be justified…” (Rowe 527). Here we see that when something is bad, it is an evil. Could Rowe mean that whenever something is bad that it is evil? Does that define evil? Are there instances of evil which are not bad? Are there instances of bad which are not evil? It seems to me that every case of bad is a case of evil and vice versa. However, Rowe fails to define what bad is. All that we know so far is that intense human and animal suffering is an instance of bad, and therefore evil, but what bad/evil is in itself is left undefined. Perhaps bad is something that the individual does not like or, what a society decides to be distasteful. I wonder if a society that found great sport and enjoyment out of pointless intense human and animal suffering would change the status of those incidents being evil. What if that society were the only one on earth? The atheist should define evil, and give account of where the standards come from.
Rowe outlines his argument on page 527:
(1) There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
(2) An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
(3) There does not exist and omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.
Put more simply a theistic god could and would extinguish evil (as in intense suffering), but evil is not extinguished, so a theistic god must not exist. Here Rowe puts some important parts into his argument just to make it tighter, namely by specifying that the theistic god could and would be able to prevent evil “without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse” (Rowe 527). The idea behind this is that allowing evil would be justifiable and permissible if it were the best course of action, best if it avoided other evil like the lose of a greater good or the occurrence of a different evil. Rowe then examines each premise and after an examination of premise two he concludes that it is one that both theists and non-theists would be in agreement on. So then, the contention is over the first premise (Rowe 529).
Rowe gives an example of intense suffering which he thinks could be prevented by telling a plausible story of a fawn. A fawn, or baby dear, is in a forest that is distant from humans and lightning strikes the forest, which in turn starts a forest fire. The fire badly burns the baby deer which lies in terrible agony for a few days until it finally dies (Rowe 529). What Rowe is trying to get at is that, as far as humans can tell, this evil of the fawn suffering is pointless. It would seem that god would be able to prevent this without forfeiting a higher good or causing another evil. Indeed it would be hard to imagine a good that is foregone or another evil being incurred by stopping this intense suffering of the fawn. Pointless suffering could be stopped without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. If any suffering were really pointless then premise (1) would be true.
Is the fawn’s suffering really pointless? Is any suffering pointless? As Rowe says on page 529 “So far as we can see, the fawn’s intense suffering is pointless.” So, because the fawn’s intense suffering appears pointless to us, it is rational to believe that it is pointless. Rowe claims that an all knowing and all powerful and all good god could and would do something about it. But, since nothing is done, such a god doesn’t exist.
Then later he says that “the fawn’s apparently pointless suffering does not prove that (1) is true” and, “it would seem to require something like omniscience on our part before we could lay claim to knowing that there is no greater good connected to the fawn’s suffering in such a manner that an omnipotent, omniscient being could not have achieved…” (Rowe 529). He says that “In light of our experience and knowledge… the idea that that none of this suffering could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing a greater good or permitting an evil at least as bad seems an extraordinary absurd idea, quite beyond our belief” (Rowe 530). In other words, because of our experience and knowledge, it is absurd to believe that this suffering that appears pointless has a point. So, because it is beyond our belief, it is reasonable to believe that premise (1) is true, even though it cannot be proven true (Rowe 530).
Rowe is putting forward a hypothetical theistic god that is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. It seems, though, that he is saying that if such a god existed it would still be rational to believe that intense suffering is pointless because of our experience and knowledge. It seems to me that Rowe is not fully committed to or at least being inconsistent with entertaining the idea of a theistic god. Consider this:
– An omnibenevolent God has a good purpose for everything.
– There is some evil for which we see no good purpose.
– Therefore, there is a good purpose for all evil, even if we do not see it.
(Geisler 222)
An omnibenevolent god would have a purpose for everything. An omniscient god would know how to carry out that purpose. An omnipotent god would be able to carry out that purpose. Rowe says that it is “quite beyond or belief” to think that all suffering would have a point to it, that it is “an extraordinary absurd idea” because of our experience and knowledge. It is strange to think that if there were an omniscient being ones experience and knowledge could override that of the god. If the theistic god really were omniscient, it would seem that the god’s knowledge would supersede any human knowledge or experience. We would have to conclude that if we don’t see the good purpose for evil and if there is a theistic god, then there must be a purpose for it that we do not see. Therefore I hold that it is unreasonable to believe that premise (1) is true, or that it is a rational belief. Neither should Rowe, lest he be inconsistent with his portrayal of the theistic god. Rowe says that a direct attack on premise one is useless because “the theist does not know what greater goods might be served, or evils prevented by each instance of intense human or animals suffering” and, “the theists own religious tradition usually maintains that in this life it is not given to us to know god’s purpose in allowing particular instance of suffering” (Rowe 531). Here Rowe tries to put the burden of proving the point of suffering on the theist, however it is not the theist that is said to be omniscient, but rather the theistic god. When entertaining the idea of such an omniscient god and limited humans, the burden of proof would not lie with the theist to prove the purpose of suffering, but rather with the atheist to prove the pointlessness of suffering. In order to do this the atheist would have to claim to be omniscient to even suppose that the posited theistic god has made no purpose to suffering. I am confident that no atheist would claim omniscience. I can think of no reason why, if an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent god existed, Rowe would put human knowledge and experience over the god’s. Perhaps it is because he holds so firmly to a belief that this kind of god does not exist that he becomes unable to consistently entertain the idea of that god for the sake of argument. That’s why he puts human knowledge and experience over the idea of a theistic god in order to prove that there is no theistic god. However that would be a clear fallacy to include the conclusion in the premise.
Later in the article Rowe presents the strongest argument against his by using the G. E. Moore shift on page 532:
· Not (3) = There exists an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.
· (2) = An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
· Not (1) = It is not the case that there exist instances of intense suffering which and omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
It would be in the hands of the theist then to show rational grounds to accept the first premise: the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. This could be done by various ways: using the ontological, teleological, and cosmological arguments; appeal to religious experience; or as an account for a variety of phenomena (Rowe 533). I have to point out that what I accused Rowe of doing in his argument is not happening here. Rowe justified his first premise by supposing his knowledge and experience trumped the omniscience of a possible theistic god, by assuming his conclusion is true (that a theistic god doesn’t exist). Here, however, the justification for the first premise is found not in the assumption of the conclusion (that a theistic god has purpose in suffering), but rather in the existence of such a god from other arguments.
Rowe then defends the position of friendly atheism: the view that some people are justified in believing that the theistic god exists (Rowe 533). This does not mean that you accept the truth of the theistic belief, but rather believe that “the theist has rational grounds for his belief, a belief the atheist rejects and is convinced he is rationally justified for rejecting. Can someone… believe that someone else is equally justified in believing the opposites? Surely this is possible.” (Rowe 533). Rowe says that he recognizes that the theist has logical grounds for the existence of a god, but rejects them for rational reasons. However, he fails to mention why he is convinced that he is rationally justified for rejecting the grounds of the theist. I have already mentioned how I reject the ground of his particular argument for atheism – premise (1) – at use in this article; a rejection that I believe is rationally justified.
Even though I reject the problem of evil as a justification for atheism, there still seems to be some difficulty in how a theist is to understand natural evil. Here I will give some ways for the Christian to deal with the problem of evil. As a theist and Christian myself I had always heard that evil is the absence of good and that evil things happen when free men choose to do bad things. However this explanation (which is overly simplified) does not satisfy me in explaining natural evil. The example of the fawn appears to have nothing to do with human free will. I will use verses from the Hebrew and Christian scriptures to attempt to give a philosophy for the Christian in dealing with natural evil. Whether one should trust the Scriptures is another story for another day.
When God created humans, humans were given control over creation. “Then God said, ‘Let us make people in our image, to be like ourselves. They will be masters over all life—the fish in the sea, the birds in the sky, and all the livestock, wild animals, and small animals.’ God blessed them and told them, ‘Multiply and fill the earth and subdue it. Be masters over the fish and birds and all the animals’” (New Living Translation, Genesis 1.26, 28). “The Lord God placed the man in the Garden of Eden to tend and care for it” (Genesis 2.15). We also see that God brought the animals to Adam for him to give names to all of them (Genesis 2.19, 20). Here it is clear that God gave control of the earth to humans for us to care for it.
Adam disobeyed God when he was deceived by a serpent, which is symbolic for Satan. When humans disobeyed God, punishment was issued out. “And to Adam he said, ‘Because you listened to your wife and ate the fruit I told you not to eat, I have placed a curse on the ground. All your life you will struggle to scratch a living from it. It will grow thorns and thistles for you, though you will eat of its grains.” (Genesis 3.17, 18). Here we see that the ground, the earth, creation was cursed for the sin of Adam. It may seem an unfair punishment, but this concept is not foreign to us. Whatever is done by the head or the leader of something affects everything that is under the responsibility of that leader. Examples may be seen in heads of state, generals in the military, scientists in a lab, etc where their decisions have positive or negative consequences on everything they are in charge of. Such was the case with Adam. He was placed in charge of the earth and he sinned. The punishment not only went to him but also to everything that was under his responsibility. We see the effects of sin on the entire earth “Against its will, everything on earth was subjected to God’s curse… For we know that all creation has been groaning as in the pains of childbirth right up to the present time.” (Romans 8.20, 22). Creation was cursed from Adam’s disobedience, and would seem that part of the curse came with his choice to obey Satan instead of God; he transferred the authority given to him by God to rule the earth to Satan. This is why the Bible later says “You used to live just like the rest of the world, full of sin, obeying Satan, the mighty prince of the power of the air. He is the spirit at work in the hearts of those who refuse to obey God.” (Ephesians 2.2). When we as a human race decided to disobey God, we in effect decided not to do things his way, and, through obeying Satan, we surrendered control of the earth to him.
This explains why natural evil happens, the earth is under control of Satan, who is the evil one (Matthew 13.19). But one may still object by pointing out that if God is good then he would destroy evil (including Satan), and if God is all powerful he could destroy evil, but evil is not destroyed, so how does the Christian deal with this? Consider this from Geisler p. 221
(1) God is all good and desires to defeat evil.
(2) God is all powerful and is able to defeat evil.
(3) Evil is not yet defeated
(4) Therefore, it will one day be defeated.
“So you see, just as death came into the world through a man, Adam, now the resurrection from the dead has begun through another man, Christ. Everyone dies because all of us are related to Adam, the first man. But all who are related to Christ, the other man, will be given new life… After that the end will come, when he will turn the Kingdom over to God the Father, having put down all enemies of every kind. For Christ must reign until he humbles all his enemies beneath his feet. And the last enemy to be destroyed is death.” (1 Corinthians 15.21-22, 24-26). “All creation anticipates the day when it will join God’s children in glorious freedom from death and decay.” (Romans 8.21). In these verses we see God’s promise to conquer evil one day and to remove the curse from the earth, restoring it and bringing new life.
Still, while recognizing the cause of natural evil, and even while recognizing that an all good and all powerful God will defeat evil; one may wonder: what is God’s purpose for such intense suffering? First, an answer to the suffering of Christians: “Dear brothers and sisters, whenever trouble comes your way, let it be an opportunity for joy. For when your faith is tested, your endurance has a chance to grow. So let it grow, for when your endurance is fully developed, you will be strong in character and ready for anything.” (James 1.2-4) and, “And we know that God causes everything to work together for the good of those who love God and are called according to his purpose for them.” (Romans 8.28). As we can see pain and suffering are used for good in the Christian’s life.
As for those who rebel against God, we see that God can use pain and suffering and things thought to be evil to try to get people’s attention. “‘I brought hunger to every city and famine to every town. But still you wouldn’t return to me,’ says the Lord. ‘I kept rain from falling when you needed it the most… but you still wouldn’t return to me,’ says the Lord. ‘I struck your farms and vineyards with blight and mildew… I sent plagues against you… I destroyed some of your cities… but still you wouldn’t return to me,’ says the Lord.” (Amos 4.6-11). If God is the greatest good, then it would be a good thing for God to try to get people’s attention for them to return to Him, even if it involves intense human suffering. It could be that every second there is some kind of intense human and animal suffering. Perhaps we can understand some of the human suffering, but what about the animal suffering? For both kinds of suffering, as long as we are under the curse of sin and Satan is in control of the earth there will be both human and animal suffering until God defeats Satan and with it all evil. However the longer God waits the more fawns are being burned in the forest as well as other kinds of intense sufferings, so why doesn’t God hurry up? At the same time, every second longer God waits to defeat evil and judge the world is a good gift, a chance to turn to the greatest good: God.
In conclusion, I find that William Rowe’s argument for atheism to be lacking. Theism is not incompatible with the problem of evil. Evil in this world is the result of free actions of men, and is allowed to go on to perfect the Christian, turn the heart of the rebellious to God, and allow more time for people to get right with God. The religious philosophy of Christian theism towards the problem of evil provides a great way to look at the problem, and actually gives hope to its followers. There is much more to be said about the theology of evil, but that would be for an entire book. I might suggest that few other worldviews offer as good and encouraging outlook on the problem of evil as the Christian worldview does.
Bibliography
Geisler, Norman. “Evil, Problem of”. Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic. 2006
Rowe, William L. “The Problem of Evil”. The Philosophy of Religion Reader. (2008). p. 526-536
Student’s Life Application Bible. New Living Translation. Wheaton: Tyndale. 1997.
seizeeternity 